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“...the efficiency of financial 
systems rests primarily on 
proper risk assessment and 
management in project 
evaluation. “ 
1.    Introduction 
 
                The real options approach considers strategic management and decision-making 
as a process aimed at actively reducing exposition to downside risk and promoting exposi-
tion to upside opportunities. It stands at the hinge between pure finance and other areas of 
decision making under risk such as project evaluation, market entry and exit, organiza-
tional restructuring and re-engineering, technology adoption, climate change and biodiver-
sity decisions, etc. 
 
                The approach underlines a frame of mind and uses methodologies that appeal to a 
wide array of managers, thus providing a common language. Real options have applica-
tions in many areas that are central to modern corporations: market coverage and develop-
ment, finance, human resources management, technology management, R&D and knowl-
edge management, etc.  
 
                Thinking in terms of real options represents a major development in strategic but 
remains relatively unknown in spite of its adoption by firms such as Airbus, GE, Hewlett 
Packard, Intel, Toshiba and others. Nonetheless, as shown in the academic literature and as 
argued in some of the quotes below, the contribution of higher level managers to the value 
of a firm lies in the creation and the exercise of real options. Indeed the value of strategic 
management itself can be assessed that way.  
 
                At a more macroeconomic level, the efficiency of financial systems rests prima r-
ily on proper risk assessment and management in project evaluation. The real options ap-
proach is the crucial analytical tool to fulfill such a need and act as a link between the fi-
nancial and the real sectors.  
 
Some quotes from the business press:  
 
“The oil, energy and pharmaceutical industries have long used the real options 
framework to assign value to non-financial assets like R&D projects and oil 
leases. ‘Real options prices the value of an opportunity,’ says Brice Hill, controller 
in the server division of Intel Corp. in Hillsboro, Ore. And companies can use a 
real options valuation to determine how much they are willing to spend to create 
an option on a particular opportunity. ‘It used to be that any level of investment 
was appropriate to create a strategic option,’ says Hill. ‘But now if an option has a 
specific value -- say, $50 million -- then a company might be willing to spend up 
to $50 million to create that option.’ ” (Business Finance, March 2002) 
 
 
“The oil, energy and 
pharmaceutical industries 
have long used the real 
options framework to assign 
value to nonfinancial assets 
like R&D projects and oil 
leases.” 
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“Real-options analysis rewards flexibility and that’s what makes it better than to-
day’s standard decision-making tool, ‘net present value.’ NPV calculates the value 
of a project by predicting its payouts, adjusting them for risk, and subtracting the 
investment outlay. But by boiling down all the possibilities for the future into a 
single scenario, NPV doesn’t account for the ability of executives to react to new 
circumstances, for instance, spend a little up front, see how things develop, then 
either cancel or go full speed ahead.” (Business Week, June 7, 1999) 
 
“The real option approach emphasizes that many investments create important, 
follow-on opportunities that a company may or may not subsequently exp loit. 
Consequently, the real option approach highlights value that is contingent on ear-
lier investments. For instance, while a given R&D investment may have a very 
low or even negative net present value, it may also provide platforms for future, 
favorable investments. Real options bear some other similarities to financial op-
tions. For example, the value of both types of options increases with uncertainty. 
Further, by providing managers discretion - rights but not obligations - financial 
and real options can help companies limit their downside risk while also gaining 
access to upside opportunities in the future. However, unlike financial options, 
real options come into existence by the opportunities created by the company’s 
strategic investments. Because their underlying assets do not trade in liquid ma r-
kets, real options also present unique valuation challenges.” (Financial Times, 
May 5, 2000) 
 
“Real options valuation grounds strategic thinking and decision-making in con-
crete financial analysis. ‘When companies make strategic investments, they tend 
to do so with a thumbs up or thumbs down from the CEO and no financial analy-
sis to the decision,’ says John McCormack, senior vice president and head of the 
energy practice at Stern Stewart & Co., a management consultancy in New York 
City. ‘But when you have strategic investments that require choices in the future,’ 
real options can guide those decisions. The model also enables an organization to 
recalculate the value of a project or investment as it progresses and to understand 
what must happen before the project or investment can move successfully into the 
next stage of development. (Business Finance, March 2002) 
 
“Exploit hidden assets and you will succeed. Neglect them and you will wind up 
with a collection of old nags. What kind of hidden assets do I mean? For example, 
the unexploited opportunities to add a new product line, expand overseas or en-
gage in e-commerce are hidden assets that do not appear on a company’s financial 
statements and have not yet contributed to its profits. When you buy a company, 
you often get these features for free. I call them ‘real options,’ an analogy to the 
“Real-options analysis rewards 
flexibility and that’s what 
makes it better than today’s 
standard decision-making tool, 
NPV.” 
 “Real options valuation 
grounds strategic thinking and 
decision-making in concrete 
financial analysis.”  
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financial options traded in Chicago. There’s a big difference, though. Financial 
options remain valuable when held by passive investors. But owning a business is 
not a passive exercise. The owner has a real job to do, providing governance, man-
aging capital and helping a business achieve its potential.” (Forbes magazine, May 
29, 2000) 
 
“Real options analysis is based on the observation, first made more than 20 years 
ago, that a company evaluating an existing asset or potential investment is in 
much the same position as the holder of a financial option, such as those written 
on stocks or commodity prices. The holder of a financial put option on, say, the 
price of oil can exercise that option if the price rises above a pre-agreed level, but 
doesn’t have to if the price falls. Similarly, the owner of a marginally profitable 
oil field has the right to exploit it if the price of oil rises, but is not obliged to do so 
if it doesn’t. That observation leads to the assumption that the future value of such 
an investment can be best valued in a similar way to financial options, rather than 
by simply discounting the cash flows expected from it in future. In particular, op-
tion valuation takes into account the risks and rewards of future uncertainty, or 
volatility, which traditional discounted cash flow (DCF) models do not.” (CFO 
Europe, July 1999) 
 
“To evaluate potential projects, they almost invariably have to resort to a theory of 
corporate finance called the ‘Capital Asset Pricing Model’ (CAPM). Yet real-life 
managers tend not to like this model, for the simple reason that it ignores the value 
of real-life managers. So they might welcome some recent academic work. In the 
ivory tower, they are talking about ditching the CAPM for a rival, called “real op-
tions theory”, that places managers at its very core. More fundamentally, the flaw 
in the CAPM is that it implicitly assumes that when firms buy new assets, they 
hold these passively for the life of the project. But they do not. Instead, they em-
ploy managers precisely in order to react to events as they unfold. Obviously, this 
managerial flexibility must be worth something. Options on “real” assets (and in-
deed poker bets) behave rather like options on financial assets (puts and calls on 
shares or currencies, say). The similarities are such that they can, at least in the-
ory, be valued according to the same methodology. There is a snag, of course: 
sheer complexity. Pricing financial options is daunting, but valuing real options is 
harder still. Their term, unlike that of financial options, is usually open-ended or 
undefinable. The volatility of the underlying asset can be difficult to measure or 
guess, especially since it is not always clear what it is - if, for example, it is yet to 
be invented. How can one define the appropriate benchmark asset-class in the case 
of a new drug for a rare disease? And there may be additional variables to con-
sider, such as the strategic benefit of pre-empting a rival.”  
“...option valuation takes into 
account the risks and rewards of 
future uncertainty, or 
volatility…” 
“Pricing financial options is 
daunting, but valuing real 
options is harder still.” 
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(The Economist, August 12, 1999) 
 
                As is clear from these quotes, the real options methodology is emerging as a po-
tentially powerful tool for the executive. However, this potential will only be realized by 
decision-makers who combine the “real option state of mind” with both a good grasp of 
technical skills and a good information system. The implementation of a real options ap-
proach could be very valuable but at the same time is a challenging task. However it is 
very much in the spirit of real options to finish with a sobering quote from before the En-
ron debacle:  
 
“Enron President and Chief Operating Officer Jeffrey K. Skilling (credited) 
realoptions thinking with helping Enron transform itself from a U.S. natural-gas 
pipeline company into a global wheeler-dealer that trades commodities including 
gas, electricity, water, and, most recently, telecom bandwidth.” (Business Week, 
June 7, 1999)  
 
                Real options does not pretend to be and will not become a substitute for proven 
business values and virtues. A better appreciation and exploitation of risks and opportuni-
ties will neither completely shield a firm from the dangers inherent to business nor fully 
protect it from the temptations of fraudulent behavior. The paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 explores the links between real options and finance. Section 3 considers real op-
tions as a tool for project evaluation. Section 4 suggests ways to implement real options in 
strategic planning exercises. Section 5 surveys the technical tools available in real options 
analysis. Section 6 presents some detailed real option examples. Section 7 briefly discusses 
the impact of real options on project risk management and Section 8 concludes. 
 
2.    The Link between Real Options and Finance 
 
                As a direct outgrowth of finance, the real options approach uses techniques and 
methodologies which prevail in that field. However, finance is mostly preoccupied with 
evaluating and pricing financial instruments, put and call options among them. As the real 
options approach percolates into various areas of management and decision making, there 
is a shift of emphasis from pure evaluation to decision analysis and optimization. 
 
                The origin of the real options approach can be traced back to the remark by Stew-
ard Myers of MIT that holding a real investment project like the construction of a plant (or 
the adoption of a new technology, a restructuring plan, the exploration of a new market or 
product, the development of an R&D program) was formally similar to hold ing a financial 
call option. A real investment project involves the option, but not the obligation, to spend 
resources at some future time in order to obtain an asset (an operating plant) whose value is 
“Real options does not pretend to 
be and will not become a 
substitute for proven business 
values and virtues.”   
 “A real investment project 
involves the option, but not the 
obligation, to spend resources at 
some future time in order to 
obtain an asset (an operating 
plant) whose value is normally 
stochastic.” 
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normally stochastic. The randomness of a financial option arises from the fact that the un-
derlying asset is usually a stock, so that, at the time the option is acquired, it is not clear 
whether the known exercise price will be lower or higher than the still unknown stock price 
in the future; thus the option may never be exercised. Similarly, if  the price of the projected 
plant’s output does not evolve favorably, or if further future research reveals that operating 
costs would be high, then it may not be worthwhile completing, that is engage in the n-th 
stage, or exercising the plant construction option. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                The distinction between option evaluation and decision making is only a matter of 
emphasis. In fact evaluation requires solving the decision problem raised by the option: 
should it be exercised and when? But the distinction is important: it underlines that good 
decision making creates value. As we argue below, the objective of applying the real op-
tions approach to decision making in organizations is to create value by capturing the full 
value of the firm’s potential. This approach brings the strong discipline of finance into 
other areas of corporate planning activities, of public policies, and of individual endeavors. 
 
                Another difference between financial options and real options arises from the na-
ture of the uncertainty affecting the underlying asset. In the world of financial options, un-
certainty is all about future stock prices. Uncertainty is then a source of value because of 
the limited downside and unlimited upside fluctuations of the pay-off, fluctuations that are 
linked to the exogenous (outside the control of the managers) variability or volatility of the 
price of the underlying financial assets. 
 
                In the world of real options, uncertainty has value because of the ability of execu-
tives to manage the uncertainty of projects. In a world without uncertainty, managers 
would not be needed. Executives add value to the firm because they actively manage 
change as uncertainty unfolds over time. In a sense, the real options approach attempts  to 
quantify that value, that is, the value of active management of uncertainty by managers. 
 
Call Option on Stock Real Option on Project 
Current value of stock (Gross) PV of expected cash flow 
Exercise price Investment cost 
Time to expiration Time until opportunity disappears 
Stock value uncertainty Project value uncertainty 
Risk free interest rate Risk free interest rate or risk adjusted 
rate 
Factors affecting the value of financial and real options  
“...the objective of applying the 
real options approach to decision 
making in organizations is to 
create value by capturing the full 
value of the firm’s potential.”   
“In the world of real options, 
uncertainty has value because of 
the ability of executives to 
manage the uncertainty of 
projects.”   
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               This crucial difference in the nature of uncertainty has its counterpart in the nature 
of the information that needs to be used for option evaluation and management. For finan-
cial options, most of the time long and frequent data series are available about stock prices. 
For a real option such as the construction of a production plant, the uncertainty arises from 
future prices or production costs. While product prices may have some similarity with 
stock prices, they are not usually recorded with the same accuracy, nor are they driven by 
the same factors. When it comes to costs evaluation, both the form and the nature of the 
data available are fundamentally different. 
 
                There are also differences in the institutional environment characterizing the op-
tion evaluation and decision making problem. An important one is that financial markets 
are often rich and dense enough that appropriate portfolios of existing traded assets can 
duplicate the risks associated with the asset underlying a particular option. It is under such 
circumstances that the celebrated Black-Scholes-Merton approach is applicable. In the case 
of many real options, this so-called ‘spanning’ assumption cannot be invoked because mar-
kets are thin and opaque so that other techniques, such as stochastic dynamic progra m-
ming, must be used instead of the contingent claims approach prevalent in financial appli-
cations. 
 
                Although widely used in finance, techniques such as stochastic dynamic optimiza-
tion are by far not specific to that field. Being used by managers and engineers as well, 
they often constitute a common tool and language by which real options techniques and 
methodologies are spreading more easily from finance into other areas.  
 
                Certainly, the technical dimension of option evaluation is important and is part of 
the conceptual breakthrough that was recognized by the 1997 Nobel prize in economic sci-
ences awarded to Robert C. Merton and Myron S. Scholes “for a new method to determine 
the value of derivatives.” But beyond techniques, the real options approach is mostly a way 
of thinking and adjusting one’s behavior accordingly. It rests on the explicit  
 
? recognition that uncertainty creates opportunities and value; 
? recognition that such value requires adequate decisions in order to materialize; 
? identification of the sources of uncertainty and collection of information; 
? identification of the decisions (options) that promote exposition to favorable out-
comes; 
? identification of the decisions that reduce exposure to downside risk;  
? design of optimal decision rules. 
 
3.    Project evaluation and Real Options 
 
“...beyond techniques, the real 
options approach is mostly a 
way of thinking and adjusting 
one’s behavior accordingly.”  
“The real options approach is 
best seen as an improvement to 
conventional discounted net 
present value determination; it 
does not invalidate the 
procedure but amends the way it 
is applied.”  
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                Project evaluation is the most obvious application of the real options approach, 
although by no mean the only one or the major one. Before the real options approach, the 
standard evaluation procedure was discounted net present value (NPV). The real options 
approach is best seen as an improvement to conventional discounted net present value de-
termination; it does not invalidate the procedure but amends the way it is applied. In fact it 
rationalizes what many evaluators are already doing on intuitive grounds:  
 
? attach importance to the timing of decisions; 
? identify and evaluate downside risks and upside opportunities associated with the 
project; 
? identify, evaluate, and optimize future decisions that may affect exposition to down-
side or upside fluctuations; 
? to sum up: optimally manage the creation and use of flexibility as a device to ex-
ploit uncertainty. 
 
                Once these dimensions of the project are introduced, projects become proactive 
instruments that modify the way uncertainty affects results in the decision maker’s favor. 
Proper evaluation of costs and benefits always was crucial in conventional net present 
value evaluation. In a real options approach, costs and benefit evaluation becomes more 
difficult. Options created by the project now enter as benefits; options used up or exercised 
by the project enter as costs. In both cases these options must be valued and in most cases 
such evaluation involves finding the optimal way to decide whether and when an option 
must be created, held, or used up. 
 
 
 
Real Options and Active Management 
 
Knowledge of real options empowers managers with the tools to calculate more accu-
rate and appropriate net present values (NPV) and thus make better strategic business 
decisions. One can think of calculating the proposed RO-strategic NPV of a project 
defined as: 
 
Standard conventional NPV 
+ 
Option premium from active management 
= 
RO-strategic NPV 
“Project evaluation is the most 
obvious application of the real 
options approach, although by 
no mean the only one or the 
major one.”  
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                A real options approach helps executives quantify the value of active manage-
ment. Since the conventional NPV calculations typically are based on the discounted value 
of average outcomes, the ability of executives to actively manage a project is not ac-
counted for and therefore the conventional NPV will typically underestimate the true NPV 
of a project. Active management limits the downside and enhances the upside of the distri-
bution of the NPV outcomes and can change the expected NPV from negative to positive 
as the graph below illustrates. Moreover the ordering of mutually exclusive projects may 
not be the same. The upshot is that if the conventional NPV approach is taken, then truly 
profitable or more profitable projects are not implemented causing shareholder value of the 
firm to be less than maximal. 
 
Figure 1: 
NPV distribution without (dashed curve) and with (continuous curve) real options 
evaluation  
Example 1: Vacation packages 
 
                Consider the following example: your travel agent offers you two types of vaca-
tion packages to the destination of your choice: "rigid" and "flexible". Under the "rigid" 
package you have to specify exactly the dates of your vacation. Under the "flexible" pack-
age, you can go for any seven consecutive days between May 1st and September 30th. Fur-
thermore, the flexible package is 100% refundable while the “rigid” package is not refund-
able at all. How much more would you be willing to pay for the flexible package? To sim-
“...if the conventional NPV 
approach is taken, then truly 
profitable or more profitable 
projects are not implemented 
causing shareholder value of the 
firm to be less than maximal.“ 
NPV distribution without and 
with real options evaluation 
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plify the problem, imagine you know for sure you will be able to take a week off this sum-
mer, but you don’t know whether it will be in July or August. You estimate that each 
month has an equal probability of being convenient. Assume further that a week’s vacation 
to the destination is worth to you $10,000 more than your next best alternative (a week at 
the cottage). 
 
                Since you don’t know which month will be convenient, you toss a coin, and you 
pick July for the rigid vacation. Here are the payoffs of the rigid package, with RPV stand-
ing for “rigid package value”: 
 
                Since both July and August have equal probability of being convenient, ignoring 
risk, the maximum you would pay for the rigid package is RPV = $5,000 = (½ $10,000 + ½ 
$0).  
 
                Consider now the flexible package. It allows you to take your vacation any time 
this summer. So, the payoffs to the flexible package are, with FPV standing for “flexible 
package value”: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                Either way, you take your vacation, so you would be willing to pay FPV = 
$10,000 for the flexible package. In this specific example, the value of flexibility is as big 
as the value of the inflexible package itself. This is not unrealistically high: a flexible fully 
refundable airline ticket with open dates may cost as much as five to ten times a non-
refundable ticket with fixed dates. 
 
                The above example illustrates the basic evaluation method of both financial and 
real options. Both standard textbook put option evaluations and the vacation package ex-
ample are overly simplistic. Their main weakness is perhaps that they consider situations 
where, although valuation is an issue, the decision that confers its value to the option (sell 
the stock; take the trip) is obvious in each case. In most real situations the decision whether 
“In this specific example, the 
value of flexibility is as big as the 
value of the inflexible package 
itself.“  
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and when to exercise the option is the outcome of a complex optimization process which 
maximizes the value of the option. 
 
                However simple, these illustrations do demonstrate how the methodology devel-
oped for analyzing financial options can be applied to real world problems. In fact the dif-
ference between choosing a flexible vacation package and an interruptible power supply 
scheme or package is not that great. Of course, both the financial and the real options 
valuation methodologies utilize substantially richer descriptions of the uncertainty and em-
ploy more realistic assumptions. In the rest of our discussion, we mention and sometimes 
analyze several cases when real options have been or could be successfully applied to im-
prove management decision-making. All of those cases are substantially more complicated 
than the above example. The basic underlying objective remains to optimally manage the 
creation and use of flexibility as a device to exploit uncertainty. This involves the follow-
ing steps: 
 
? identification of the sources of uncertainty and collection of information; 
? identification of the relevant future decisions; 
? construction of optimum decision rules. 
 
4.    Strategic Planning and Real Options  
 
A good strategic plan is a plan that builds real options into the foreseeable future of the 
firm and sets up an optimized decision making process to fruitfully exp loit those options. 
Again, real options should be recognized, built in and evaluated for each major step of 
every project: alliances, acquisitions and mergers, spin-offs, technology development and 
management, organizational restructuring, etc. The value of strategic planning itself is de-
termined by the quality of the real options designed and imbedded in the plan and by the 
quality of the evaluation procedure of those real options. It is in this precise sense that the 
design and management of real options, through the exploitation of uncertainty, create 
value for the firm and that they represent the most important responsibilities of the manag-
ers in determining a strategic plan. 
 
                Strategic planning is an exercise in managing flexibility. Plans should specify de-
cision nodes, that is to say future steps that may or may not be taken, at dates that may be 
given but are mostly to be chosen optimally as the future environment of the firm unfolds 
in a stochastic way. Furthermore, preparing a strategic plan is not a passive exercise in an-
ticipating the future; it is an exercise in shaping the future or, more precisely, an exercise in 
preparing the way, in due time, the future will unfold to the decision maker’s advantage. 
That is, managers are planting the seeds of future flexibility by identifying and creating 
real options. This is again a key difference between real options and financial options: with 
“In most real situations the 
decision whether and when to 
exercise the option is the outcome 
of a complex optimization process 
which maximizes the value of the 
option.” 
“...managers are planting the 
seeds of future flexibility by 
identifying and creating real 
options.” 
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real options, managers are creating the tool or using existing tools in highly creative ways; 
in the case of financial options financial executives usually pick their tools in the – some-
times highly exotic – kit of available instruments. 
 
                As mentioned above, a financial option cannot have a negative value because its 
owner has the possibility of exercising it, but never the obligation to do so. Nonetheless, 
one important characteristic of real options in an oligopolistic environment is that a firm 
may be less valuable if it holds a real option than if it does not. This paradox arises as fol-
lows. The value of real options derives from the active management of a project’s steps and 
variations as uncertainty unfolds over time. However, the possibilities of modifying the 
planned course of a project imply that the firm’s commitment to develop and eventually 
complete the project is relatively low. This lack of commitment may invite more aggres-
sive behavior from competitors, whose objective may be to drive the firm out of the project 
or market, or more aggressive attacks from the opponents to the project. Active manage-
ment means that such options, although valuable in a competitive non reactive business 
environment, may not be valuable in an oligopolistic reactive business environment: man-
agers must sometimes burn their bridges. It is a major responsibility of higher level manag-
ers to identify which options should be closed in favor of strong commitment and which 
options should be kept open in favor of f lexibility. 
 
5.    Real Options: New techniques and Procedures 
 
                The real options approach uses all the mathematics of finance. However standard 
financial techniques and procedures cannot always be applied in the real options context. 
The most frequent reasons are that real risks cannot always be reproduced by market in-
struments so that arbitrage or equilibrium methods such as the Black-Scholes-Merton 
method are not valid; data on the underlying asset (project value) are not available in as 
convenient forms as financial data; the identification of available options often requires 
analyses that involve other fields of economics, and other disciplines in management, or-
ganization, engineering, etc.  
 
                Consequently the array of techniques and procedures involved in the real options 
approach is typically wider than in financial options. Decision tree analysis with optimized 
decisions at various nodes, and stochastic dynamic programming are prevalent techniques, 
usually applied numerically. Stochastic dynamic programming, as a mathematical tool, is 
much in the spirit of the real options approach: it seeks the maximization of a stochastic 
value function that can be interpreted as the value of the firm or the project, that depends 
on optimal decisions to be taken in the future upon the arrival of information or the realiza-
tion of some events still unknown at the time of the evaluation. As an optimization tool it is 
already widely used in such areas as inventory management, reservoir management, etc., so 
“...real risks cannot always be 
reproduced by market 
instruments so that arbitrage or 
equilibrium methods (…) are not 
valid...“  
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that a real options approach may be within the reach of a broad base of management and/or 
scientific personnel in the firm with a good training in finance and industrial economics. 
 
                Stochastic dynamic programming relies on the quality of information. The analyst 
must identify each step and characterize each decision in terms of its probabilistic effect on 
the state variables, its  cost, its information content, its degree of reversibility or flexibility. 
Such information is usually highly project specific so that each project may require a sub-
stantial investment in data collection and analysis. 
 
                Often the analysis must go beyond data. Fully-fledged industrial analysis is war-
ranted when decisions are truly strategic: competition, preemption, signal extraction mo-
tives, asymmetric information, and so on, become key issues. The evaluation of a new 
“plant” development project should yield different results, other things equal, when the 
new plant is explicitly considered as an addition to an existing portfolio of “plants”, in the 
firm itself and in the industry as a whole. Similarly the evaluation of a new aircraft project 
involves strategic choices best addressed by real option evaluations. 
 
                Another important tool of the real options approach is simulation. For examp le, 
with adequate data on past demand or on past water replenishment rates, one can generate 
samples of possible future demand trajectories or water levels. A promising new technique 
consists in drawing econometric inference from such simulated samples1. 
 
6.    More elaborate illustrations  
 
Example 2: A safe known technology versus a promising but uncertain alternative.  
 
                Telecommu nication service providers serving both the fixed wire and  
the wireless markets recognize the importance of responding to the growth of the internet, 
both by adding switching and transmission capacity in the backbone, and by expanding 
bandwidth into customer sites. 
 
                Consider a telecommunication company having an opportunity to expand its data 
transmission capacity by choosing between the following two technologies: 
 
 
 
 
____________________________ 
1 See Longstaff, F.A. and E. S. Schwartz, “Valuing American Options by Simulation: A Simple 
Least-Squares Approach”, Review of Financial Studies 14(1), Spring 2001, 113-47. 
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? DSL (Digital Subscriber Lines) technology that increases the transfer capacity of 
the classic telephone lines (formerly designed for voice transfers) to allow higher 
speed for data transmission. 
? Broadband Wireless technology such as MMDS (Multichannel Multipoint Distribu -
tion Service) that combines data transfers with voice transfers. 
 
                In the case of the wireless MMDS technology, both costs and demand are much 
more uncertain than in the case of the DSL technology. As a rough approximation of that 
situation, assume that the future value of the DSL technology is known with certainty, 
while the future value of the wireless technology is uncertain. One suspects it will increase 
relative to the value of the DSL technology but there may be accidents and delays along the 
way. 
 
                This may be represented as illustrated in Figure 2 where the values of technolo-
gies DSL and MMDS are measured on the vertical axis and time is measured on the hori-
zontal axis. The value D of the DSL technology is a constant since it is know with certainty 
by assumption. The value V of the MMDS technology tends to rise with time at a positive 
rate but in a stochastic way (modeled as a geometric Brownian motion). It may, but need 
not, dominate the constant-value DSL technology at some time in the future. One illustra-
tive realized path is graphed in Figure 2 but many other paths are also possible ex ante. 
 
                The company holds an option to invest. It must choose between the mutually ex-
clusive DSL and MMDS technologies and also the optimal timing of the investment. The 
analysis of this investment problem leads to an optimal decision rule characterized by two 
thresholds. It is optimal for the firm to adopt the DSL technology if the value V of the 
MMDS technology is lower than VL, and it is optimal to adopt the MMDS technology if V 
is greater than VH. For all values of V lying between VL and VH, the firm should rather 
wait and see before expanding its data transmission capacity. The threshold values VL and 
VH must be determined as an optimal decision rule or strategy through a real options 
analysis. 
 
                It is noticeable that the presence of the uncertain MMDS technology, and its 
analysis in a real options framework, drastically affect the standard evaluation of the DSL 
technology project: at time zero, in a standard NPV evaluation setting, the latter would be 
undertaken since, in our example, it yields a higher expected net present value than the 
MMDS technology. The real options approach emphasizes the arbitrage between foregoing 
certain current profits by waiting, and avoiding potential future losses from choosing a 
technology which would turn out later to be a loser. Thus, below the threshold VL, the DSL 
technology is adopted because it dominates the MMDS technology by such a margin that it 
“The company holds an option to 
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is not likely that the situation will be reversed in the near future (but not impossible, as il-
lustrated in Figure 2, for more distant future dates). Hence, if the value of the MMDS tech-
nology were to follow the stochastic path illustrated in Figure 2, the firm waits till period 
t*, the first time at which the process leaves the [VL , VH] interval; the firm chooses the 
DSL technology since at t* the value of the MMDS technology is below VL. 
 
Figure 2: 
Constant DSL, geometric Brownian motion MMDS, and decision thresholds  
 
                The real option approach provides rigor for the determination of the appropriate 
decision rule and therefore for the evaluation of the investment option. We can alterna-
tively represent the solution as in Figure 3 where the expected NPV of the two technolo-
gies, measured on the vertical axis, are given as functions of the current expected value (or 
best estimate) V of the MMDS technology, which is known today but stochastic in the fu-
ture. The net present value of the DSL technology, which is by assumption known with 
certainty, does not depend on V and is represented as a horizontal straight line at D; the net 
present value of the MMDS technology is illustrated as a 45-degree line with the negative 
intercept representing the cost of the investment. 
 
 
 
 
“The real option approach 
provides rigor for the 
determination of the appropriate 
decision rule and therefore for 
the evaluation of the investment 
option.” 
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Figure 3: 
Values of investing in the MMDS technology, of investing in the DSL technology, or to 
wait, according to the current value of the MMDS  
 
                An investment decision based on an NPV analysis would require the DSL tech-
nology to be acquired immediately if V<D, while the MMDS technology would be ac-
quired whenever V>D. However, by holding on to its option to invest in either technology 
when V lies between the lower and the upper limits VL and VH, the firm raises its net value 
to the level indicated by the thick gray curve which includes the option value. The value of 
the firm or project coincides with the values given by the NPV analysis in situations where 
the decision is clear-cut (outside the [VL , VH] interval) but it is higher than the NPV of 
both technologies in situations where managerial discretion requires waiting (when V is 
inside the [VL , VH] interval) because of the value of the option to wait. 
 
                Of course the current example could be extended to account for the fact that in-
vestment in either technology creates different options for subsequent developments. 
 
Example 3 (general): Stochastic input costs and flexible technologies 
 
                The following integrated example of a specific manufacturing problem involves 
several real options that are identified and described briefly in the foregoing section. Exa m-
ple 3 (specific) below provides a more detailed analysis for the interested reader. 
 
“...investment in either 
technology creates different 
options for subsequent 
developments.” 
 Page 18 Value Creation, Risk Management and Real Options 
               Manufacturing companies often have the option to produce some of the energy 
they need. In the present example, a firm faces a choice between three industrial boilers to 
generate steam and electricity. The first boiler burns natural gas, the second burns fuel oil, 
and the third can switch between the two inputs. 
 
                The first two boilers illustrate the traditional trade-off between operating costs 
and acquisition cost. Whether or not one dominates the other depends on future fuel prices. 
Evaluating and comparing them for immediate acquisition requires forecasting future input 
prices but does not require investigating any particular future decision: once acquired, 
there is only one way to operate either technology. 
 
The value of technological flexibility: the fuel switching option. 
                The third boiler involves additional flexibility. As the first two, its value depends 
on future fuel prices; but in addition its value depends on the rule that will be used for 
switching between fuels in the future; that rule must be optimized and its proper choice 
confers value to the technology. In contrast with the acquisition of either one of the first 
two technologies, acquiring the flexible technology creates the option to switch between 
fuels in the future according to future fuel prices. Note that this is not an option to invest, 
but an option to manage (switch). Since future fuel prices are not currently known, future 
switching dates cannot be built into the project for evaluation. However the rule determin-
ing switching may be selected and the expected value of owning the boiler, conditional on 
that rule being used in the future, may be determined. 
 
The value of waiting: the timing option. 
                While acquiring one of the first two technologies does not create any option, the 
real options approach applies to them nevertheless. This is because their acquisition uses 
up an option: before acquiring a boiler, the firm has the flexibility to buy any boiler, or to 
wait and see; once the boiler is purchased, the option is exercised and there is no way back, 
whatever the future prices of gas and oil may turn out to be. The timing of the acquisition, 
together with the choice of one particular technology, need to be optimized. As with the 
switching option, the decision maker does not choose a date but an optimal decision rule 
that will be used for the choice of the stochastic acquisition date. 
 
From the single machine to the plant portfolio. 
                In the decision sequence presented above, the real options approach helps evalu-
ate the value of flexibility in a boiler. The operating rule is described in a rigorous fashion, 
and the decision whether or not to invest in such a boiler is optimized. 
 
The real options approach can be applied in the same spirit to decisions of a much wider 
scope. Acquiring a gas-fired power plant may have a different value for one utility that dif-
“The timing of the acquisition, 
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fers from the value it may have for another utility, depending on the existing portfolio of 
plants of each firm.  Conventional NPV evaluation would not capture such a difference. 
For example if one power plant technology is affected by climate change (hydro power) 
while another technology is affected by fossil fuel cost (gas-fired plant), the same plant, to 
be used to serve the same market will probably be worth less to a firm that already owns 
several plants of the same type than to a firm that does not. 
 
                This is so for two reasons. The first one is the conventional reason associated with 
financial portfolio construction reinterpreted in the context of real assets: given any opera-
tion rule, the correlation between the value of the new plant and the other assets of one firm 
is likely to be different from the correlation between the value of this same new plant and 
the other assets of another firm. The second reason, emphasized by real options, is that 
each firm would choose a different operation rule to manage the new plant if it acquired it. 
Under conditions unfavorable to operating that plant, the firm with few similar plants could 
switch it off while serving demand with other equipment, while the other firm could not. 
The real options approach helps determine more precisely how this should be done and 
what the implications for plant and firm evaluation are.  
 
Example 3 (specific): Stochastic input costs and flexible technologies 
 
The value of technological flexibility: The fuel switching option 
                When a project involves several options, each future option confers value to ear-
lier ones. Hence the evaluation of future options must precede the evaluation of current 
options. We start with the fuel switching option, focusing on the following question. If the 
firm acquires the third boiler now, then what is the value of its flexibil ity? What is the 
switching rule that confers its value to that flexibility? The answer to both questions de-
pends on currently known parameters such as current prices, discount rate, and uncertainty, 
as described now. 
 
                The boilers may be described by their acquisition price and their efficiency-
adjusted price of fuel. The efficiency-adjusted price of fuel is the spot price of the relevant 
fuel, that is Pgaz or Poil, times a factor that reflects the thermal efficiency of the boiler. 
Suppose that the price of the first boiler is $63,500 and its efficiency-adjusted price of fuel 
is 1469Pgaz, that the price of the second boiler is $66,600 and its efficiency-adjusted price 
of fuel is 1408Poil, and finally that the price of the third boiler is $68,700 with the same 
thermal efficiencies as the single-fuel boilers: its efficiency-adjusted price of fuel is 
1469Pgaz when it burns gas and 1408Poil when it burns oil. Therefore, the price of natural 
gas equals the price of fuel oil, on an efficiency-adjusted basis, when the price ratio (Poil / 
Pgas ) equals 1.04 (=1469/1408). Moreover, the option to switch fuel inputs is more valu-
able if the efficiencyadjusted price ratio frequently crosses the point of equality.  
“When a project involves several 
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                When the ratio of the price of oil over the price of gas (Poil / Pgas ) is higher than 
1.04, it would be less costly to operate the gas boiler than the oil boiler, or to operate the 
flexible dual boiler in the gas mode rather than in the oil mode. If the price ratio is lower 
than 1.04, the reverse is true.  
 
                Let us suppose that there is a fixed cost S to switch fuels in any direction when the 
flexible dual boiler is used. What additional value does the dual-fuel technology confer to 
the firm? In practice the fuel price ratio typically behaves as in Figure 4: it often crosses 
the 1.04 value. However it is not clear that the price ratio stays on either side of 1.04 for a 
long enough time to justify incurring the fixed switching cost, nor is it clear that it ever 
stays far enough on either side of 1.04 for substantial cost differences to arise between the 
oil and the gas regimes. Intuitively the higher the switching cost S, the further the price ra-
tio must move away from the critical 1.04 value and the longer it needs to stay away from 
1.04, for a switch to be warranted. 
 
                A formal analysis gives a precise content to that intuition: as illustrated in Figure 
4, there are two critical values of the price ratio. One of them, Pg, governs switches from 
oil to gas; it is higher than 1.04 and lies further away from that value, the higher the 
switching cost. The other critical value, Po, of the price ratio governs switches from gas to 
oil; it is lower than 1.04 and lies further away from that value, the higher the switching 
cost. Not surprisingly for users of the real options approach, the two trigger price ratios 
move further away from the 1.04 value as uncertainty (volatility) increases2. 
 
                The decision rule just described maximizes the profit derived from the dual tech-
nology. By comparing this profit with the profit achieved if the best single-fuel technology 
at the current price ratio is used, one can compute the additional value conferred to the firm 
by the dual-fuel technology. The difference is the value of the flexibility option contained 
in the dual-fuel technology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________________ 
2 Decisions to sell or purchase electricity on the spot markets can be shown to obey similar rules. 
 
“...the two trigger price ratios 
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Figure 4: Switching Rules and Sample History of the Price Ratio 
                Clearly, if the price ratio were constant, one of the single-fuel technologies would 
be best and the value of flexibility would be zero. Generally, the higher the volatility in 
prices, the higher the value of the flexibility option. Uncertainty is usually seen as depress-
ing profits as well as minds. The real options approach emphasizes the opposite. A firm 
may be modeled as holding various options. As in the above example, these options are 
more valuable when uncertainty increases and so does the value of the firm. As a matter of 
fact, flexibility is not limited to technological and operational flexibility. Most business 
decisions, especially strategic decisions, involve trading resources against flexibility. The 
real options approach may help evaluate them. 
 
The value of waiting: the timing option 
                The analysis of the fuel switching option has established, at any time or, equiva-
lently, at any fuel prices, the value of the ability to switch in the future. Thus a firm consid-
ering the purchase of a boiler can compare at any date the value of the flexibility option 
with the acquisition cost premium associated with the dual-fuel technology and decide 
which is best.  
 
                If the flexibility option is worth more than the difference between the cost of ac-
quisition of the dual-fuel burner and the cost of acquiring the alternative single -fuel burner, 
it does not follow that the firm must go ahead with the investment. At any date the manager 
must decide whether it is time to buy, or whether it is preferable to wait in order to avoid 
regretting the decision in case the price ratio evolves unfavorably. Once the investment is 
realized it is irreversible: realizing the investment involves a loss of valuable flexibility. 
“Generally, the higher the 
volatility in prices, the higher the 
value of the flexibility option.” 
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The foregone option to wait must be included as a cost of the project. This is where the real 
options approach again modifies the conventional NPV approach. 
 
                More contextual information is necessary to address this issue. We need to know 
the value of the production of the proposed boiler in order to evaluate the opportunity cost 
of waiting. Here the boiler allows the firm to substitute its own energy production for pur-
chased electricity. There may be two main reasons to buy a boiler: purchased electricity is 
becoming more expensive; or boilers are becoming cheaper to acquire or operate.  
 
                Let us focus on the price of purchased electricity Pe. If that price is very low, it is 
clear that no boiler needs to be purchased. This suggests that there is a threshold price of 
electricity below which the manager should wait and above which the manager should go 
ahead with the acquisition of a boiler. In that case the analysis of the previous section indi-
cates that the choice between the three types of boilers depend on the fuel price ratio, as 
indicated in Figure 4. 
 
                When the relative price of electricity is low, it is preferable to buy electricity 
rather than produce it from one’s own boiler while at high relative prices of electricity it is 
preferable to operate a boiler. Which boiler? Above which electricity price? When the 
price of oil is low relative to the price of gas (Poil / Pgas is low), chances of buying the 
wrong boiler are low; thus the oil boiler should be bought if the ratio of electricity price 
over oil price (Pelect / Poil ) is above some benchmark as illustrated in Figure 5. However, 
when the price ratio (Poil / Pgas ) is closer to PPo, it is more likely to cross the PPo line in 
the future, which would imply that the manager would prefer owning a dual boiler and 
would regret having acquired an oil boiler. To avoid the mistake of buying the wrong 
boiler, the manager requires a higher relative electricity price to make the irreversible deci-
sion. Thus the boundary separating the “wait” locus from the “buy oil boiler” locus is up-
ward slopping. Similarly when the ratio (Poil / Pgas ) is only slightly below PPg, buying a 
dual boiler might turn out to be a mistake if the ratio increases above PPg: thus the man-
ager cautiously requires a higher relative electricity price before deciding. 
 
                Clearly, since the dual fuel boiler is more expensive, the threshold of the ratio 
(Pelect / Poil ) warranting its acquisition is generally higher than in the case of single fuel 
boilers. This suggests that the threshold electricity price depends on the fuel price ratio, as 
drawn in Figure 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
“To avoid the mistake of buying 
the wrong boiler, the manager 
requires a higher relative 
electricity price to make the 
irreversible decision.” 
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Figure 5: Boiler Buying Rule 
                Figure 5 is based on a conjecture that could only be confirmed and made precise 
through a complete real options analysis. The curve that separates the ‘wait’ domain from 
the ‘Buy gas boiler’ domain is downward sloping because, the closer the fuel price ratio is 
to the PPg value below which the dual boiler is a better buy than the gas boiler, the more 
likely it is that the fuel price ratio will go over the line in the future: if this happens and the 
manager has purchased a gas  boiler, that decision will turn out to be a mistake. To protect 
himself against such mistake, the manager extends the waiting period by requiring a higher 
relative electricity price when the fuel price ratio is close to PPg. 
 
7.    Real Options and Risk Management 
 
                A financial option is the right but not the obligation to a payment, positive or 
negative, in the future based on the value of an underlying asset. Financial options are 
hugely important securities since they allow investors to construct portfolios with virtually 
any desired payoff profile, and thus enable investors to implement any view of the market, 
however sophisticated, and therefore manage the financial risks they face. Examples in-
clude Bull and Bear spreads (market will go up or down), Butterfly spreads (market will be 
tranquil), Straddle combinations (market will be volatile), Strips and Straps (market will be 
volatile but is more likely to go down than up and vice versa) and so on. A key feature of 
all these strategies is that the downside risk is limited when a long position is taken. This 
illustrates another key feature: options not only can help in taking speculative positions in 
“A financial option is the right 
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the market, but they also can help in managing risk as well. If one is long in equity and 
worried about an impending stock market crash, buying out-of-the money puts could be an 
effective and insurance policy. 
 
Combining real and financial options. 
                A firm that owns a single-fuel burner may use financial instruments to insure it-
self against fuel price fluctuations. For example if it owns a gas burner, it may buy a hedge 
that guarantees it to be able to purchase gas at some prescribed price should the spot price 
exceed that prescribed price.  
 
                Such hedges may also be considered if the firm owns a dual-fuel burner. They 
would be used as an insurance against the risk of incurring the fuel switching cost. If such 
insurance or hedging contracts are available at reasonable costs, it will affect the optimal 
switching rule determined in the absence of such financial instrument. The firm will be 
able to let the gas/oil price ratio increase to a value higher before switching to oil and vice-
versa for gas. 
 
                Thus the availability of financial instruments may alter real management, just as 
insurance may alter management in general. This in turns affects the value of the flexible 
technology: the better the available financial contracts, the lower the value of real flexibil-
ity. Similarly, the more flexibility, the less insurance is needed. Flexible technology, flexi-
ble organization, flexible activities, etc. are all possible substitutes for insurance combined 
with some rigidity. Self insurance is not only the ability to withstand adverse occurrences, 
but also the ability to reduce their impact through adequate management decisions. 
 
                The relevance of financial options to risk management is well established. How-
ever, financial options are just one of many instruments of real risk management. Real op-
tions, as the main tool to manage and value real asset flexibility, is probably the most im-
portant tool. As we have stressed earlier, real options analysis focuses on management 
rules that avoid bad outcomes while seeking exposure to good opportunities. By so doing 
the approach establishes that risky projects have more value, but also require a premium in 
order to be undertaken. This may sound very similar to finance, where investors trade vola-
tility for expected return, except for a major difference: while the owner of a financial port-
folio is passive once portfolio content has been established, the manager of a real portfolio 
must apply a particular management decision rule in order to realize the potential of real 
options. 
 
                Also, real managers often face decisions where the benefits of a project are rela-
tively well known, while its costs are highly volatile and uncertain. For example, if the is-
sue of climate change is how costly it may be to avoid a given temperature change, then 
“...options not only can help in 
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managing risk as well.” 
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real options indicate that the precautionary principle should be applied: undertake avoid-
ance projects whose expected net present value may be negative, provided it does not lie 
below some threshold value. In such cases, uncertainty do not delay, but speed up, invest-
ment. 
 
                There are other situations where volatility is not a cause for walking away from an 
investment. If a project is highly volatile, but tends to be negatively correlated with other 
projects held by the firm, then the former derives value, not only from the option to under-
take it in case of “good news” while leaving it aside when its prospects are not high 
enough, but also from the possibility to use it as insurance in case other projects fail. This 
is reminiscent of the Beta of a financial asset. Just like an asset with a negative Beta de-
rives additional value from the fact that it can provide insurance against fluctuations in the 
market portfolio, a real option whose value tends to move in the opposite direction as other 
options derives additional value from this ability. 
 
                However, the potential of real options to project evaluation, real management, and 
risk management can only be realized if the relevant variables (sources of risk, processes 
for the relevant variables, and correlations) are well identified and measured. This requires 
firms to gear themselves up in the same way as they have learned to be aware of and ex-
ploit financial volatilities and beta values. 
 
                In fact there is also an analogy between the single asset mean-variance model and 
the single asset real options model on one hand, and between the several assets CAPM 
model and the several assets real options model on the other hand. In the first two in-
stances, volatility is what matters; the value of a financial asset is lower, the higher its vola-
tility. In the second two instances the correlation between assets is just as important as their 
volatility; a low beta, or a low coefficient of correlation between asset values, improves the 
ability of an asset (whether real or financial) to be used as insurance, thus giving it addi-
tional value. 
 
                As mentioned in the introduction, the efficiency of financial systems rests on their 
ability to assess the real sector on which they are based. Real options will allow financial 
institutions to apply to the real sector techniques and approaches that are similar in spirit to 
those used and developed for the financial sector, thereby meeting the requirements of the 
Basel accords. 
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8.    Conclusion 
 
                The real options approach may bring the discipline and accuracy of finance into 
various areas of decision-making. The approach is relevant to a very large array of man-
agement and strategic decisions involving uncertainty and irreversibility. This is why many 
pioneer firms are starting to use it to take better advantage of a proactive type of manage-
ment and create value. 
 
                Implementing a real options approach is not easy however. The standard proce-
dures used in finance must often be adapted or replaced with other techniques. Each appli-
cation of the real options approach is likely to be context specific. The available options 
must be envisaged and described; the relevant information must be identified and collected 
carefully; the executive using a real options approach must have the required knowledge 
and training to adapt standard procedures to each particular situation. Perhaps most impor-
tantly the real options approach is a state of mind, a capacity and willingness to detect de-
cisions that create opportunities or protect against mishaps, and act upon them in order to 
create value for the firm.  
 
                For managers with such a state of mind, the real options approach is a tool that 
allows them to bring intuition in line with the prescriptions of rigorous decision-making 
procedures. More importantly it allows them to give a more accurate quantitative content 
and value to intuitive rules, thus gaining an edge over competitors. 
“The real options approach 
may bring the discipline and 
accuracy of finance into 
various areas of decision-
making.” 
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